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The 2008 financial crisis has drawn attention to the concept of "too big to fail" companies, 
more recently relabelled "system-critical" institutions, referring to situations where the actual 
or near-bankruptcy of a company threatens the future of a service essential to the functioning 
of society. But such instances are not limited to the financial sector. We argue that if 
policymakers and regulators are not vigilant, a similar situation could occur in the electricity 
sector. So far this industry has only experienced occasional problems, but we can observe 
several precursory signals indicating that these problems might become more frequent. These 
include a tendency to globalisation in the absence of a supra-national regulator and the 
disruption caused by large amounts of renewable energies, resulting in companies to be 
stranded with loss-making thermal generators. Still, these units are essential for the electricity 
supply security. We discuss several cases illustrating these trends. We conclude with a 
discussion of how electricity regulators and policymakers should approach the “too big to 
fail” problem, focussing both on preventive measures that can be taken to keep such a 
situation from occurring and on proactive actions aimed at avoiding a crisis once a system-









Over the last decade mismanagement, hubris and a general regulatory inefficiency have 
endangered major players in essential industries, resulting in near-catastrophic crises. 
Examples include the financial sector world-wide (Stiglitz, 2010), the rail industry in the UK 
(Shaoul, 2004), health insurance in Switzerland (Assura 2012a, 2012b) and ambulance 
services in Denmark (Fyns.dk, 2017). Common to all these cases has been the actual or near-
bankruptcy of one or more companies, threatening the future of a service essential to the 
functioning of society. This raises the following question: how should a government react in 
a situation where it simply cannot allow a service to break down? For instance, in the Danish 
ambulance case, authorities could neither let the company go bankrupt (implying an 
interruption of the service), nor continue to tolerate substandard response times endangering 
patients' lives.  
 
These events have drawn attention to moral hazard issues (Allen et al., 2015), which have 
long been a concern at the individual level, e.g., bonus systems rewarding high profits, 
without properly penalising poor performances induce traders to take excessive risks. When 
the downside of decisions carries little or no sanctions, actors have an incentive to focus on 
the upside. During and after the financial crisis there has been a significant debate concerning 
whether the precedent of bailing out certain financial institutions might lead to a higher level 
of risk-taking in the sector, due to increased reliance on government intervention should 
things go wrong (Allen et al., 2015). The term “too big to fail” was coined following the 2008 
financial crisis, at a time when global financial stability was under threat, to characterise the 
key players that were critical to the stability of the system. More recently, these companies 




We argue in this paper that if policymakers and regulators are not vigilant, a similar situation 
could occur in the electricity sector. So far, this industry has only experienced occasional, 
local, problems. Examples include the challenges faced by the nuclear sector in England and 
Wales (Taylor, 2007), the well known problems in California at the beginning of this century 
(Sweeney, 2013) and the difficulties faced by smaller distribution companies in Colombia 
(Larsen et al. 2004). However, we can observe several precursory signals pointing to more 
serious problems.  
 
A first symptom is the increasing size of many companies. For instance, the Danish company 
DONG has evolved from being a regional oil company to becoming a dominant player in the 
national electricity market (DONG, 2017a). In other countries, despite deregulation, there has 
been reluctance to split up incumbent national champions, e.g., EDF still dominates the 
French market. More generally, since deregulation we observe a transition from local or 
national companies to international, if not global concerns. Companies have expanded across 
borders, and even continents. For instance, Vattenfall and E.ON today have subsidiaries in 
several European countries, while Endesa (now owned mainly by Enel) expanded rapidly 
across South America. This consolidation across the industry results in a situation where the 
failure of one or a small number of companies can create havoc, as occurred in the financial 
sector, where the bankruptcy of a single company had world-wide consequences. While 
larger companies may benefit from economies of scale, they represent a risk factor; this is 
particularly the case in the electricity sector, where companies often have a very low degree 
of diversification.  
 
A second concern relates to who actually regulates the electricity sector. Financial services 
have both national regulators and international surveillance bodies, such as the Bank for 
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International Settlements (BIS), the Financial Stability Board and the International 
Organization of Securities Commissions, or the European Banking Authority at the European 
level. While electricity markets are under the control of regional (in the USA) or national 
(most European countries) regulators, there is a lack of coordination across jurisdictions. This 
missing element enables companies to try to game the different legislators. Where such 
coordination does exist (e.g., EU regulation and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
in the USA), the focus is on market access and environmental regulation, not on companies' 
long-term financial health. The existence of supra-national regulatory bodies did not prevent 
the 2007-2008 financial crisis: early warning signs were overlooked and actions were delayed 
by the lengthy negotiations required to reach agreements. Still, these institutions have proven 
very useful in the aftermath of the financial crisis as a forum to try to agree common rules for 
large financial institutions.  
 
A third concern results from technological change. Nuclear, hydro and thermal generators 
typically worked with a time horizon of thirty years or more. But over the last decade many 
of the largest players of the electricity sector have been caught off-guard by the rapid, large-
scale, introduction of subsidised intermittent renewable generation technologies, i.e., wind 
and PV. Their profitability has suffered significantly as prices have dropped: they are 
stranded with significant investment which cannot be amortised under the new market 
conditions. This has resulted in companies mothballing recently built plants (e.g., CCGT 
plants (Reuter, 2015)) or decommissioning plants earlier than scheduled. The accelerated 
closure of thermal plants has caused concerns about the availability of generation capacity at 
times where the intermittent capacity is not available, leading many countries to introduce 





While the failure of a critical generator or distributor endangers supply, this is only one 
aspect of the security of supply in the electricity sector (Larsen et al., 2017), another essential 
element being transmission. But, as the transmission grid is operated as a monopoly in most 
countries, investment decisions and profitability of grid owners and operators are directly 
controlled by the regulator. In this paper we thus focus on generating companies, and to a 
lesser extent on distributors. 
 
The three concerns me have discussed (company size, regulatory issues and technological 
change) are not the only elements affecting whether or not a company is system-critical. 
Resilience also plays a role. For instance, other things being equal, a plant situated in a poorly 
interconnected area is much more likely to become system-critical. Such risks should be 
taken into account by policy makers when assessing whether or not a company is "too big to 
fail". 
 
The paper is organized in the following way. After a brief recall of the 2007 financial crisis 
we provide an overview of recent events in the electricity industry, identifying trends that 
point towards the emergence of "too big to fail" companies in this sector. We discuss how 
such companies could be identified and identify possible governmental actions. We conclude 
with a discussion of what can be learned from the past and what could be done to limit the 
risks related to system-critical companies in the electricity industry.  
 
2. Background 
What sectors are subject to the “too big to fail” syndrome? As discussed above, any sector, 
public or private, where a breakdown would have an immediate, large scale, detrimental 
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impact on the provision of an essential good or service, whether at a regional, national, or 
global level, is concerned. We do not consider events such as the closure of a large factory 
resulting in regional unemployment, with possibly devastating effect on the local economy, 
or environmental disasters such as the Deepwater Horizon oil spill (Encyclopædia Britannica, 
2017). While these problems are important and need attention, they are outside the scope of 
this paper as they do not lead to a long-term disruption of an essential good or service.  
 
The issue of what happens when the collapse of a few firms in an industry can potentially 
take down the sector, or at least major parts of it, came to the forefront in connection with the 
financial crisis in 2007. While the discussion of its causes is still ongoing, there is general 
agreement that this led to a sudden awareness, among both policymakers and the general 
public, of the potential global consequences of the failure of large companies in essential 
industries.  
 
The attitude and behaviour of many financial institutions in the decade preceding the 2007 
crisis created concerns about the resilience of the financial system. Without going into 
details, there is a fair degree of agreement that the crisis resulted from a combination of 
factors, including weak regulation (e.g., excessive leverage enabled by insufficient capital 
requirements (Admati and Hellwig, 2014)), herd behaviour (e.g., housing bubbles resulting 
from overly optimistic price expectations (Krugman, 2009)) and what some have labelled 
global greed (e.g., investors getting used to high returns while becoming complacent about 
the risk of losses (Reavis, 2012)). This crisis has been extensively described and analysed in 
many publications, without reaching consensus on the exact causes and responsibilities. See, 
e.g., Taylor (2013), Wolf (2014), Sorkin (2009) and Paulson (2013). Neither is there 
consensus on the actual costs of the crisis, nor on who footed the bill, apart from some 
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obvious victims such as evicted home owners and (small) companies that did not survive the 
ensuing credit crunch. While it is clear that the tax payers initially bailed out the financial 
institutions, the extent to which they have since recouped their losses remains disputed; so is 
the size of the gains or losses of the shareholders of the financial institutions. While there 
clearly were multiple causes to this crisis, there is no doubt that regulatory failure was one of 
them.  
 
3. Collapses, near-failures and other horror stories from the electricity sector  
The events from the last decade and the experience gained from the financial sector raises the 
following questions: could something similar happen in the electricity sector, on what scale, 
what precursory signals (if any) should one look out for and, maybe most importantly, what 
preventive actions can regulators take to avoid getting into such a situation? Due to its 
physical characteristics (electricity is not a global commodity; it can only be traded over a 
limited distance) an instantaneous global collapse of the sector is unlikely. But significant 
problems at the national or regional level are possible as companies internationalise and 
cross-border markets are established. In this section we discuss a number of collapses or 
near-collapses in the electricity sector. We have chosen examples with different underlying 
causes to illustrate the variety of problems that can occur. For each case we provide a short 
vignette and discuss the causes of the problem. A table providing an overview of all the cases 
is given in Appendix. 
 
Maybe the best-known example is the California crisis during the 2000-2001 period, which 
affected more than 35 million people. The background to this crisis consisted of the 
combination of increasing demand and stagnating capacity in a partially deregulated market. 
These events having been described in detail elsewhere (see e.g., Joskow, 2001; Borenstein, 
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2002; Wolak, 2003; Sweeney, 2013), we summarise the main elements relevant for this 
paper. During the last half of the nineties, the demand for electricity in California increased 
by more than 4% per year, while investments in generation capacity were limited: not a single 
new power plant had been built for over a decade (McNamara, 2002). This led to increasing 
imports, particularly from the North-Western USA. At the same time California began to 
deregulate the industry, following the “standard” model of deregulation, i.e., beginning with 
wholesale competition (Sweeney, 2013). Unfortunately, the winter of 2000 was particular 
cold in the North-West of the USA, limiting its ability to export to California; this led to 
shortages, and eventually occasional rolling blackouts. The two main distribution companies 
were caught in a regulatory system that allowed wholesale prices to increase without bounds, 
while the retail price was regulated and fixed. This brought both companies to the brink of 
bankruptcy, forcing the State of California to bail them out: by August 2001 the state had 
spent USD 10 billion on buying electricity, which was then sold on to the distribution 
companies at the regulated price for a mere USD 3 billion, creating a USD 7 billion loss for 
California (Sweeney, 2002). While this capital injection saved the companies, the citizens of 
California are footing the bill to this day. Letting the two main distribution companies go 
bankrupt was not an option for the State, as it would have resulted in large scale disruptions 
of California's electricity supply. While the State might have come up with other solutions, 
these would have been equally, if not more costly, and possibly more disruptive.  
 
The regulatory framework, while not the only cause, contributed significantly to the 
problems. First, the market design (i.e., the decoupling between the retail and wholesale 
markets), was a direct cause of the escalating losses. Second, the lengthy approval process for 
new power plants, which allowed for multiple appeals by different stakeholders (up to twelve 
years (Sweeney, 2013), compared to three to four years in other states), in a period of 
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significant demand growth, created a shortage of generation capacity and an excessive 
reliance on imports.  
 
A second example is Electricaribe, an electricity retailer in the north of Colombia, with 2.6 
million customers and no participation in generation. The Spanish group Gas Natural Fenosa 
(GNF) owns eighty-three percent of the company, while the remaining is owned by public 
entities (Eltiempo, 2016). During the years leading up to 2015, this retailer faced financial 
problems due to the non-payment of electricity by a non-negligible fraction of its customers, 
both private and public. The situation was exacerbated by a severe episode of El Niño in 
2015 and 2016, which increased the electricity price significantly, creating liquidity problems 
for the company. Electricaribe became unable to obtain much needed credit, resulting in an 
inability to deliver the required level of service: supply became unreliable, with a high degree 
of interruptions. In this sector quality is commonly measured by the grouped quarterly index 
of discontinuity (itad), where lower values denote a better quality. While Electricaribe's true 
itad was 0.038, it reported a value of 0.015, just below the upper limit of 0.016 specified it in 
its contract with the regulator, in an attempt to hide its difficulties. But the poor service level 
led to several demonstrations against the company between January and May 2016. While it 
was obvious that the company was in serious need of re-capitalisation, its parent company, 
Gas Natural Fenosa, rejected any capital injection unless it received state guarantees that 
public institutions would pay for their consumption.  
 
During 2016 the situation grew worse: the company being no longer able to get bank 
guarantees for its power purchases in the wholesale market, it was forced to settle these three 
weeks in advance, which put further pressure on its finances. Generators became reluctant to 
sign contracts with Electricaribe, forcing the company to announce to 350 of its unregulated 
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clients that it would no longer be able to supply them in 2017. It became clear that without 
public bailout, the company risked becoming unable to trade electricity, endangering supply 
to its captive customers (Elheraldo, 2016). In November 2016 Electricaribe was taken over 
by the government. The Public Services Superintendence, a public entity, was forced to take 
out a loan to inject the USD 100 million required for the company's operations in November 
and December of 2016. 
 
In this example one of the driving forces has been the inability of the company to lower the 
non-technical losses (i.e., people consuming electricity without paying) or, more generally, 
the challenge of turning around a company located in a difficult geographical area. When 
GNF acquired Electricaribe it was convinced it had the required experience to achieve a 
successful turnaround of a company with a long history of difficulties; this turned out not to 
be the case. Still, other companies have successfully achieved this in equally difficult 
circumstances in other areas of Colombia, e.g., in Bogota (Cavaliere et. al., 2007). 
 
A third example concerns nuclear generation, which has faced problems in many countries, 
including England and the USA. We briefly discuss the case of a UK company, known as 
British Energy, created by the government during the deregulation and privatisation process 
of the British electricity industry in 1990. This company, which owned the eight most modern 
nuclear power plants in England, as well as a coal plant, was initially state-owned; it was 
privatised in 1996. Several difficulties became apparent after the year 2000. Electricity prices 
were low due to a relatively high reserve margin, affecting income (BBC, 2002). At the same 
time, technical problems with several reactors resulted in a lower load factor, further 
depressing revenues from generation (BBC, 2002). The renegotiation of a long-term contract 
with British Nuclear Fuels Ltd. regarding the fuel disposal also proved to be problematic 
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(BBC, 2002). These three factors, combined with other events occurring more or less during 
the same time span, created major financial problems for the company, forcing it to ask for 
government intervention. 
 
The final results of the negotiation between the company, the government, and its 
shareholders and bondholders was a settlement whereby the government injected almost three 
billion Euros, the existing shareholders lost most of their equity (they received about 2.5 
percent of the restructured company) and the bondholders received control of the company in 
exchange for relinquishing more than one billion Euro in bonds (Guardian, 2008). In 2009 the 
company was bought by EDF, the French state-owned nuclear operator (The Telegraph, 
2008).  
 
4. Current trends in the electricity industry  
In this section we take a closer look at the trends in the electricity sector identified in the 
cases above: decreasing capacity adequacy, changes in market dominance, 
internationalisation and lower profitability of electricity companies.  
 
One of the main concerns to surface in recent years is capacity adequacy. While the problem 
is wide-spread, we illustrate the point with a couple of examples from European countries. In 
its 2007 report the French system operator, RTE, stated that “The security of the electricity 
supply in mainland France therefore appears to be reasonably assured for the next five 
years…” (RTE, 2007, p. 9), indicating that there was no particular concern about capacity 
adequacy, given the planned new generation and trend in demand. But by 2015 the tone of 
the report had changed significantly: “Interconnections make a substantial contribution to 
ensuring that supply and demand are balanced in France. Without interconnections, 
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adequacy could not be guaranteed and France would experience shortfalls more or less 
systematically in winter.” (RTE, 2015, p. 12). The 2016 report goes a step further, stating 
explicitly that France is no longer self-sufficient: even the most optimistic scenario foresees a 
shortfall in the absence of imports (RTE, 2016). Similar concerns have been raised by the 
England and Wales regulator over the last few years (OFGEM, 2015). This trend is particular 
worrying in Europe, which is unfamiliar with this situation: before deregulation there was 
excess capacity in most countries. However, technological change, i.e., the growing share of 
renewables, has created uncertainty for the investors and operators of thermal power plants 
(Larsen et. al., 2017).      
 
A second trend raising concerns is increasing market concentration, resulting in major players 
being able to exercise market power. While this obviously was a non-issue during the era of 
regulated monopolies, it has received surprisingly little attention since, even during the 
process leading to the break-up of incumbent national companies. The left part of Table 1 
shows the market share of the largest generator in selected European countries in 2004 and 
2015, as well as the percentage change between these two years. This selection includes the 
countries with the most extreme (largest and smallest) values. All but two of these countries 
(the UK and Germany) saw a decrease in the size of their largest generator, with the most 
notable change being a 71% reduction in Lithuania. The share of France's largest generator, 
EDF, was 86% in 2015, down from 90% in 2004. This is the largest market share among 
generators in Europe, with the exception of some small countries who still have only one 
national generation company. Estonia and Greece follow closely, with market shares of 
respectively 80% and 71%, down from 93 and 97% respectively. At the other extreme, the 
country with the lowest concentration in the EU in both years is Poland, down marginally 




(Insert Table 1 here) 
 
The most common measure used to evaluate the degree of concentration in an industry is the 
Herfindahl–Hirschman index (HHI), defined as the sum of the square of the market shares 
(Church and Ware, 2000). Regulatory authorities consider a market to be highly concentrated 
if the HHI exceeds 2,500, and moderately concentrated if the HHI is between 1,500 and 
2,500 (e.g., US Department of justice, 2010). The last two columns of Table 1 provide the 
square of the market share of the largest generators (HHI1) for 2004 and 2015. These 
numbers show that despite, the decrease in concentration, and whatever the size of their other 
generators, three countries remain well above the limit for highly concentrated industries, and 
a further two are moderately concentrated. A second generator with a market share of barely 
12% would be sufficient to push Belgium into the highly concentrated category. 
 
We posit that when electricity generation is moderately or highly concentrated, it is very 
likely that the largest company falls into the "too big to fail" category. More generally, we 
argue that even in less concentrated markets, the failure of a generator with a 30% market 
share would almost certainly require government intervention to prevent a disruption of 
supply. This raises the question of how small a generator should be to be considered non-
critical. The large number of context-specific factors (e.g., share of intermittent generation, 
cross-border transmission capacity, etc.) precludes providing a general answer to this 
question. One possible guideline consists of comparing a generator's capacity to the (de-
rated) reserve margin. While the break-down of a generator with a market share smaller than 
the reserve margin may put the electricity system temporally under pressure, an urgent 
governmental intervention is unlikely to be required. Looking back at Table 1, given the 
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current trend of decreasing capacity margins in Europe, there is little doubt that most, if not 
all, of these companies are too big to be allowed to fail. We elaborate on this in the next 
section.   
 
Next we consider briefly the internationalisation of electricity companies. Before 
deregulation and privatisation started, EDF, the French incumbent electricity utility, only 
operated in France. Today it is one of the largest global electricity producers, active in 25 
countries across the world (EDF, 2017a), with over thirty percent of its profits being 
generated outside France (EDF, 2017b). Similarly, the Italian utility company ENEL was 
active in 31 countries in 2017, mainly in Europe and South America (ENEL, 2017). Many 
other electric utilities have started to internationalise, with the whole industry gradually 
becoming more global. This affects the nature of the commitment these companies have 
towards their host countries. For instance, there is little doubt that EDF would be more 
committed and under much more political pressure in France then in, e.g., Chile. This 
evolution needs to be reflected in the regulation and the licences issued to companies 
operating outside their home country, e.g., the amount of capital required to operate as a 
generator or distributor.  
 
Finally, we turn to the profitability of generators. A Mckinsey report has calculated that 
European utilities' profitability declined by 35 billion Euros between 2008 and 2013 
(Mckinsey, 2014). As an illustration, Table 2 shows the profitability of the largest generators 
in the England and Wales market from 2009 to 2016. All companies have seen a severe 
decrease in their bottom-line, with the notable exception of SSE. This company is included 
for the sake of completeness, but cannot be readily compared to the others as it has a much 
more diversified stake in the energy industry, with significant assets in gas and the grid. 
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Another company performing quite well is EDF, despite its latest profits amounting to less 
than half the 2009 level. Together these two companies account for over 80% of the total 
profits. The decline in profitability observed in Table 2 should signal to regulators and 
policymakers that these companies deserve close attention: the collapse of any of one of them 
would bring the UK into serious trouble. 
(Insert Table 2 here) 
 
However, as shown in Table 3, these figures hide significant differences depending on the 
generation type: while nuclear and renewables are highly profitable, all companies lose 
money with traditional thermal generation (gas and coal). Note that the profitability of 
nuclear plants might be biased as this technology is highly subsidised (Ward, 2016). 
Symptomatic of the difficulties encountered by thermal generators is the fact that E.ON has 
in recent years begun to close down almost new CCGT power plants, creating concern from 
the British regulator that there might not be sufficient backup generation capacity for the 
increasing amount of intermittent renewables (OFGEM, 2015). However, it is clear that such 
closures of unprofitable plants are the only rational way forward to avoid endangering these 
companies' survival. In Germany, E.ON has taken a different, quite drastic approach. 
Realising that CCGT is no longer financially viable, the company has in 2016 spun off its 
fossil fuel assets into a separate company, named Uniper (Guardian. 2016).  
 
(Insert Table 3 here) 
 
This pattern of economic problems repeats itself across Europe, making regulators and 
policymakers increasingly worried about future security of supply (Odenberger et al., 2015). 
More and more countries are introducing various mechanisms, among others capacity 
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auctions, to try to ensure the long-term sustainability of thermal generation (European 
Commission, 2016). Lack of profitability does not only send a warning message about the 
state of the electricity sector, it also enhances the “too big to fail” risk. With decarbonisation 
of electricity markets expected to continue, markets will continue to adjust, among others by 
consolidating to increase market power (Blyth et al., 2016). 
 
Our discussion so far points to serious problems in the electricity industry; while the lights 
have so far remained on, failure may not be that far away. Regulators have started to worry 
about capacity adequacy, a relatively visible problem which could be referred to as the top of 
the iceberg. But the other issues mentioned above have only received scant attention as yet. It 
is indeed more difficult to realise the long-term consequences of a slow erosion of 
profitability or a gradual increase of international diversification. However, by the time the 
consequences of these trends become visible, the impact is likely to be abrupt and severe, 
given the absence of preventive or mitigating actions. 
 
5.  Identifying “Too big to fail” candidates 
When should a player in the electricity market be considered as “too big to fail”? In abstract 
terms, this refers to companies whose sudden disappearance would endanger the security of 
electricity supply (SoES). Aspects to consider include the segment in which the company 
operates, e.g., generator versus distributor, the market design and the market resilience. 
Resilience has been overall associated with extreme events in literature, e.g., resilience is the 
ability of a national energy system to cope with supply disruptions (IEA, 2011). In a broader 
sense, “the effectiveness of a resilient infrastructure or enterprise depends upon its ability to 
anticipate, absorb, adapt to, and/or rapidly recover from a potentially disruptive event” 




 Companies who own and operate grids but are not involved in the buying and selling of 
electricity are generally regulated as monopolies and are as such not concerned by our 
discussion. Below we discuss different elements that should be taken into account when 
assessing whether or not a company is system-critical.  
 
We first turn our attention to capacity adequacy; in this context only generators are of 
concern. As mentioned previously, the capacity margin, a key indicator of SoES (Larsen et al. 
2017), is a highly visible component of capacity adequacy. Thus, a first approach to 
evaluating the criticality of a generator consists of a direct comparison between its share of 
installed capacity and the capacity margin. To account for the very different availability 
factors of technologies, a comparison between the share of production and the (de-rated) 
capacity margin may be more appropriate. A company with a share of installed capacity or 
generation anywhere close to the capacity margin would be a candidate for the critical list, as 
its failure would endanger SoES. As discussed in the previous section (recall Table 1), there 
are several European countries where the market share of the largest company exceeds 50%. 
Another approach is to consider how the Loss of Load Probability (LOLP) would be affected 
if one of the main generators stopped producing. This would also give a good indication of 
how critical this generator is for the stable operation of the system.  
 
Still, before jumping to conclusions, the role of a generator should be put into a wider 
perspective by considering the availability of substitutes. The factors outlined above that can 
contribute to making a generator system-critical can be enhanced or mitigated by external 
factors. For instance, limited grid adequacy or reliability can lead to grid congestion, 
transforming a small, seemingly non-essential producer into a key player. Another example 
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relates to cross border capacity: a (small) country might be able to import significant volumes 
of electricity at short notice, at reasonable prices. This would require sufficient cross-border 
transmission capacity and neighbours with excess generation capacity. For instance, while 
Luxembourg can cover most of its consumption by importing from Germany (ILR, 2016), it 
would be impossible for, e.g., France, to cover a large percentage of its demand by imports. It 
should also be noted that many countries or regions have limited or no interconnections, e.g., 
the Greek islands of Cyprus and Crete, and the Spanish islands (Perez and Ramos, 2008). 
 
Next we look at profitability, another essential component which needs to be monitored 
closely, especially for critical generators (as described above) and for all distribution 
companies. When confronted with low profitability, companies can be tempted to reduce 
costs, among others by cutting preventive maintenance or by postponing essential 
investments necessary to keep installations up-to-date. This increases the likelihood of 
unscheduled down-times due to technical failure, a frequent cause of cascading blackouts. 
Such behaviour can be the start of a death-spiral, with increasingly frequent plant or grid 
breakdowns leading to lower revenues, further cost cutting, etc., as in the case of 
Electricaribe discussed above. Such events can be another signal for the regulator that a 
company is heading into trouble. 
 
While low profitability can have a number of different causes, for generators one of the more 
common ones is an excessive capacity margin, leading to low load factors and prices. 
Generation capacity cycles have been documented in several countries, leading to alternating 
periods of over- and under-capacity (Arango and Larsen, 2011; Bunn and Larsen, 1992); 
company profitability will follow similar dynamics, creating uncertainty for investors, and 
potentially making the cycle even more pronounced. This phenomenon can be observed for 
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instance around 2000 in Colombia: partly due to the economic crisis the country had a large 
reserve margin; the generators as well as the distributors lost money (Larsen et al., 2004). As 
we discussed in the previous section, for distribution companies non-payment, i.e., the 
stealing of electricity, can be a particular problem in some jurisdictions and is another signal 
regulators should pay attention to.  
 
Finally, we discuss the consequences of internationalisation as a cause for concern. Both 
generation and distribution companies have become increasingly geographically diversified 
over the last decade. Internationalisation, a step towards globalisation, occurs when a 
company starts investing in other countries, leading to a significant share of its assets being 
located abroad. In electricity markets this trend is fairly recent: until about 25 years ago most 
countries had national monopolies. This implies that today difficulties spread across borders, 
not only from a subsidiary to its parent company, but also the other way round. In the first 
case, a regulator in the home country of the parent company is unlikely to be aware of this 
risk, and even if he were, he would have limited power to intervene. In the second case, it is 
the regulator of the country where the subsidiary operates who might be unaware of the 
impending risk. In particular, he may not realise that the subsidiary is unable to make the 
necessary investments or perform essential maintenance due to the parent company 
withholding resources. One example of a parent company refusing to help out one of its 
subsidiaries is the case of Electricaribe discussed above. While early awareness may not 
enable the regulator to prevent such behaviour, it provides time to act to mitigate the 
consequences. 
 
Next we briefly turn our attention to distribution companies in jurisdictions with a partially 
deregulated retail markets, i.e., with a significant share of captive customers. Distributors 
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retailing to these captive customers benefit from a monopoly position, and at first sight seem 
to fall outside the scope of the too big to fail syndrome. Indeed, in the presence of retail 
competition, distribution is only a financial transaction and one would assume that another 
company could easily take over the customers of a failed distribution company. This 
reasoning only holds if the company is involved solely in distribution. But in the not 
uncommon case where these local monopolies own the low voltage grid, their failure can 
potentially create major problems as illustrated above with the Colombian and Californian 
examples.  
 
6. Dealing with failing companies 
Each year many companies go bankrupt; a legal process is initiated to protect the rights of the 
workforce, deal with the creditors and manage the assets. Ideally an investor is found to take 
over the company; alternatively, the assets are disposed of and the revenues used to pay off as 
many of the creditors as possible. When larger companies go bankrupt, or close down their 
activities in a given region, the job losses are likely to make the newspaper headlines. The 
workforce, the suppliers and the owners (of small companies) or share-holders (of larger 
companies) are the main losers. Still, most of these events go unnoticed by the general public: 
they do not affect every-day life.  
 
The situation is quite different when considering system-critical companies. The 
consequences for the population and the economy as a whole of letting these companies 
disappear in a disorderly fashion would be such that the state must intervene. Considering the 
electricity sector, no government can quietly sit by while the lights are being turned off. 
State-intervention can take different forms, ranging from subsidies to bridge-loans (while 
attempting to identifying a buyer) or, in extreme cases, nationalisation. Whatever the type of 
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support, the government (and indirectly the population) will foot (a share of) the bill. Such 
actions affect the other market participants, as any form of subsidies to these ailing 
companies impacts the profitability of their competitors. This might in the worst case start a 
domino effect, bringing other companies into trouble, which in turn require state intervention.  
 
Not intervening would be worse: with an insufficient electricity supply, planned outages at 
peak times might be required to avoid unscheduled, cascading blackouts throughout the 
country. This occurred for instance during the crisis in California, where scheduled 
curtailments had to be instituted (Sweeney, 2013). It is estimated that the cost of the crisis 
was approximately $40 billion in additional energy costs (2001–03), accounting for an 
estimated GDP loss of 0.7–1.5% (Royal Academy of Engineering, 2014). Overall, the 
economic losses from blackouts in the U.S., Europe, and other countries in the last two 
decades have proven to be significant.  
 
No authority wishes to face such a situation: regular blackouts are bound to lead to political 
unrest, and it is most likely that the government would be kicked out of office at the next 
election. Furthermore, the confidence of the market will be adversely affected, putting future 
investments at risk not only in the electricity sector but in the economy as a whole as 
companies would be reluctant to invest in a location without reliable electricity. Whatever the 
chosen course of action, letting a system-critical company get to a stage where a 
governmental bail-out cannot be avoided causes significant welfare losses for the population. 
 
7. Discussion and conclusion 
How should policymakers and regulators approach the “too big to fail” problem? Two 
situations must be distinguished: firstly, what preventive measures can be taken to avoid the 
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occurrence of such a situation and, secondly, if such a situation does arise, what proactive 
actions can be taken to prevent a crisis? 
 
One of the underlying causes of "too big to fail" problems is moral hazard, where companies 
believe, rightly or wrongly, that they can undertake risky ventures with impunity, as the 
government will provide a safety net should things go wrong. Putting in place regulation that 
eliminates such convictions should be a priority. The EU took a step in this direction in 2012 
for financial institutions: "the proposal ensures that a bank's critical functions can be rescued 
while the costs of restructuring and resolving failing banks fall upon the bank's owners and 
creditors and not on taxpayers" (European Commission, 2012, p. 1).  
 
Still, such measures are hard to implement; it is often politically preferable for a government 
to be seen as the saviour of an institution (whatever the hidden long-term costs for the 
taxpayer) than to hold out against the vociferous lobbying (or desperation) of large (small) 
shareholders and creditors. Still, in the context of electricity, the case of British Energy 
discussed above illustrates that measures to prevent moral hazard can be implemented: the 
company was saved, but the shareholders lost most of their equity. Therefore a first policy 
implication is that if regulators and policymakers succeed in issuing a credible threat that the 
standard procedure will be for shareholders to lose their stake, the moral hazard issue will be 
significantly reduced; companies will have strong incentives to avoiding taking unwarranted 
risks.  
 
But what if a "too big to fail company" is already on the brink of bankruptcy? What can be 
done to limit the damage without creating a precedent that could lead to future moral hazard 
problems? During the height of the financial crisis many governments have opted for the 
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"bad bank" solution: the creation of an independent entity harbouring what has been labelled 
toxic assets, e.g., non-performing loans and illiquid and risky securities (Boudghene and 
Maes, 2012). The state inherits the “bad-bank” in exchange for the injection of the necessary 
capital to recapitalise the bank, thus allowing the institution to survive and continue to 
provide its essential services. In certain cases, governments have been able to recoup part, if 
not all (e.g., Switzerland) of their investment (Arnal, 2014, Zaki, 2014).  
 
Recalling Table 3, this approach offers an interesting parallel with the energy sector, with 
thermal plants playing the role of toxic assets. Given the continuously increasing share of 
subsidised intermittent renewable generation, the future of thermal plants looks all but 
positive and further closures are to be expected. Still, it is quite likely that sooner or later the 
government will need to step in to maintain this capacity to insure security of electricity 
supply. In this perspective, E.ON's decision to keep the economically attractive assets 
(renewables and the grid), while spinning of the underperforming fossil fuel plants (creation 
of Uniper) can be interpreted as a pre-emptive move to protect its shareholders against future 
losses resulting from these plants. This raises an ethical issue though. On the one hand one 
could argue that it is unacceptable for E.ON shareholders not to be held responsible for the 
consequences of the companies' past investment decisions. On the other hand, E.ON is bound 
to argue on behalf of its shareholders that the financial difficulties faced by the thermal units 
are a direct consequence of governmental policies subsidising PV and wind energy, justifying 
its decision to delegate the problem to the government. This leads to a second policy 
implication: policy makers should intervene in time to ensure the long-term viability of 
thermal capacity units required to insure security of supply. 
 
Even in the absence of an immediate default risk, regulators should monitor several 
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indicators, among them concentration and resilience. As in other industries, regulators should 
keep a close eye on all merger and acquisition activities to prevent the emergence of 
companies able to exert significant levels of market power. Additionally, newly formed 
companies' size should be evaluated with respect to the de-rated reserve margin and their 
potential impact on the LOLP. As discussed above (Table 1) generator size is already a 
problem in many countries for conventional technologies (thermal, nuclear and to some 
degree hydro). There is no easy way to reduce this existing concentration problem in the short 
to medium term: forcing companies to spin off certain activities would in most countries 
require regulatory change, which is bound to face stiff opposition from the industry. 
However, regulators can and should avoid a worsening of the situation, e.g. by preventing 
undesirable mergers or making these conditional on certain assets being spun off. 
 
In the longer term legislative measures could be taken to allow regulators to force companies 
to split or divest certain assets, or in extreme cases take over essential, but unprofitable 
generation assets. Such assets could be incorporated into a strategic reserve. A major 
stumbling block in the latter case is the determination of a fair price.  
 
At the same time, in a period of rapid expansion into new generation technologies, regulators 
should prevent the emergence of new too big to fail companies. This point is particularly 
relevant when considering the evolution of the wind energy sector. While a large share of PV 
generation is supplied by many small, often residential, “generators”, there is a move towards 
concentration in wind, led by large generators, triggered in particular by the expansion into 
offshore wind parks. The largest developer of offshore wind farms is DONG, a Danish 
energy company, with a global market share of 16%, followed by E.ON with 9% (Energy 
Post, 2016). DONG expects to double its capacity between 2016 and 2020 in this rapidly 
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expanding market (DONG Energy 2017b). While a situation where the largest firm has a 
16% market share may seem an acceptable level of concentration, one should also consider 
the risk relating to one company playing a dominant role within one generation technology, 
especially if this technology is gaining in importance. Consider for instance offshore wind 
capacity, which is becoming the most important renewable generation technology in 
Denmark. Today DONG accounts for more than 50% of the total installed offshore wind 
capacity in Denmark (DEA, 2015), but this represent only a small share of total generation 
capacity as is therefore not considered problematic. But if DONG is allowed to retain such a 
market share of offshore wind while this technology gains in importance, the picture changes: 
DONG could soon become a system critical company. While today its profitability is 
guaranteed by generous subsidies, this will not be the case in the future, as state-support is 
progressively disappearing: offshore wind auction prices in Denmark have hit a record-low in 
2016, down by up to 53% compared to the 2015 auction (IRENA, 2017)).  
 
A further policy recommendation is the need for an ongoing monitoring of the situation, 
complemented with regular in-depth analyses of recent trends, and how the industry is 
expected to evolve over the next 4 to 5 years. Given the fast change pace of change 
characterising the electricity sector, bi-annual review could be appropriate. 
 
Such reviews should put electricity regulators in a better position to closely monitor the 
resilience of system-critical companies, an essential policy measure. Drawing a parallel with 
the financial sector, following the crisis, regulators imposed higher levels of equity capital on 
large banks to increase their robustness in case of a future crisis. This measure cannot be 
easily transposed to the electricity sector as the industry characteristics are very different, 
e.g., long-term physical assets, a supply chain from generation to distribution, the importance 
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of the mix of technologies, etc.  
 
The actions available to regulators to improve a critical company's profitability depend on the 
legal framework, for instance concerning the use of capacity mechanisms, the focus of many 
recent interventions. Measures a regulator could take to deal with struggling thermal plants 
required to maintain security of supply include:    
- Pay the company to keep the plant ready to operate in case of need (capacity payments); 
-  Limit closures or mothballing by imposing an obligation to sell the plant to an interested 
buyer, should one exist; 
- Place the generator under direct state control (creation of a strategic reserve), with or 
without compensation. 
In all of these cases, the challenge is to determine the right size of the compensation, so as to 
achieve the objective of sufficient capacity without distorting the market.  
 
It is important to emphasise that we are not arguing that companies should not be allowed to 
fail in essential industries in general, and the electricity sector in particular. Rather, we posit 
that regulation should insure that this provision cannot be endangered by the behaviour (and 
subsequent failure) of one or a small number of actors. 
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Table 1 Market share of the largest generator in 2004 and 2015, with percentage change, and 






















Poland 19 17 -6 342 303 
Lithuania  79 23 -71 6,162 515 
Spain 36 25 -32 1,296 600 
Italy 43 27 -38 1,884 729 
UK 20   29* 46 404 858 
Germany 28 32 13 807 1,024 
Denmark 36 33 -8 1,296 1,089 
Sweden 47 41 -14 2,209 1,648 
Belgium  88 49 -45 7,691 2,352 
Greece 97 71 -27 9,409 4,998 
Estonia 93 80 -14 8,649 6,368 
France 90 86 -5 8,136 7,344 
                                               * Value from 2013. Source: Eurostat, 2017 
 















2009 147 299 1131 145 165 424 2311 
2010 226 142 683 211 352 396 2010 
2011 258 293 963 168 260 466 2408 
2012 291 173 875 126 94 392 1951 
2013 153 -58 775 21 52 415 1358 
2014 38 -77 598 -118 80 338 858 
2015 73 72 602 -18 128 456 1312 
2016 43 21 474 70 73 471 1152 
Source Ofgem (2016a) 
 
 












Centrica 15.8% -11.1% 14.1%. 
E.ON - -11.0% 42.7% 
EDF 22.5% -19.4% 22.4% 
RWE - -0.6% 28.1% 
ScottishPower - -6.5% 36.1% 
Source: Ofgem (2016b) 
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